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This paper investigates the rationale for government intervention in the market for terrorism
insurance, focusing on the externalities associated with self-protection. Self-protection by one target
encourages terrorists to substitute towards less fortified targets.  Investments in self- protection thus
have negative external effects in the presence of rational terrorists. Government subsidies for terror
insurance can discourage self-protection and limit the inefficiencies associated with these and other
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Soaring prices for terrorism coverage after September 11, 2001 led to calls for gov-
ernment intervention in the insurance market (McCool, 2001). Such appeals are not
uncommon after signiﬁcant shocks to the insurance industry. Examples include the
crisis in the liability insurance market of the late 1980’s (sparked by asbestos-related
lawsuits) and the crisis in the catastrophe reinsurance market of the early 1990’s
(sparked by Hurricane Andrew), both of which were accompanied by failed cam-
paigns for federal intervention. Yet, the current push for federal involvement appears
to have reasonable prospects for success.
Such success would have precedent. Government provision of terrorism coverage
is common in developed countries that face a serious threat. Both the Israeli and
British governments participate in terrorism coverage (McCool, 2001), although they
shun direct involvement in other apparently similar catastrophe markets. Will the
U.S. follow suit? If so, what distinguishes the terror insurance market from other
markets with similar risk proﬁles?1
This paper argues that much of both the normative case and the practical impetus
for intervention lie not in the nature of terror risk—which, like that of natural disas-
ters, is both hard to predict and hard to diversify—but in the externalities associated
with self-protection. Market failure in this case arises because of fully informed, ra-
tional behavior. Potential targets of terrorism have incentives to protect themselves
against attack, but rational terrorists will substitute away from fortiﬁed targets and
toward vulnerable ones. Therefore, self-protection by one agent encourages attacks
on others, but this consequence is not considered by the agent that invests in protec-
tion. Government subsidies of terror coverage can dissuade agents from substituting
self-protection for insurance when self-protection has these negative external eﬀects.
Hence, although economists usually compare terrorism risk with natural catastrophe
risk when discussing public intervention, we argue that better analogies are drawn
with deposit insurance and war-risk life insurance—where the real issues hinge on
self-protection.2
The eﬀects of self-protection (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972) extend beyond the cal-
culus of individual optimization problems in two respects. First, an agent’s decision
to self-protect may aﬀect the price of insurance faced by other agents. Examples in-
clude anti-theft devices in automobiles, which may change overall insurance prices by
aﬀecting the behavior of thieves,3 and automobile safety, which may change prices by
aﬀecting the behavior of protected drivers or the damages associated with accidents
1A general analysis of and review of the literature on catastrophe insurance markets is provided
by Froot (1997).
2Hirshleifer (1953) provides one of the ﬁrst analyses of insurance and self-protection decisions in
the context of war risk.
3In one of the few empirical analyses of externalities in private self-protection, Ayres and Levitt
(1998) show that Lojack vehicle recovery systems generate positive externalities since the Lojack
system is unobserved.
1(Peltzman, 1975). Second, self-protection decisions may generate externalities that
aﬀect society as a whole. For example, trigger-happy bank depositors spark liquidity
crises and thereby aﬀect the operating performance of the economy (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983).
When faced with such externalities, government policy can inﬂuence self-protection
through the use of taxes and subsidies. The obvious approach is to apply taxes,
subsidies, or regulations directly to the self-protection behaviors that generate ex-
ternalities, in the tradition of Pigovian welfare economics (Pigou, 1932). However,
if self-protection is diﬃcult to deﬁne, monitor, or measure, the government can also
inﬂuence self-protection choices by instead taxing or subsidizing the purchase of in-
surance. Since insurance and self-protection are substitutes from the perspective of
the individual, a policy aimed at encouraging the purchase of insurance simultane-
ously discourages self-protection. Thus, government subsidization of insurance can
be interpreted, ironically, as a policy geared toward encouraging moral hazard.
Still another approach is the provision of public protection. Distorting an unsub-
sidized (and thus eﬃcient) market for insurance through subsidies is initially costless,
on the margin. Therefore, even in the presence of public protection, some amount of
insurance subsidization remains optimal. Moreover, in many important cases, sub-
sidies and public protection are actually complements. It is not surprising that the
two are often observed in tandem, as is the case with deposit insurance and banking
regulation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
of terrorist behavior, and develops its implications for the probability of terrorist
attack, and its relationship to private self-protection. Given these attack probabilities,
Section 3.1 explores individual decision making by targets of terror, while Section 3.2
investigates the eﬀects of government policies regarding insurance subsidies and public
protection.
2 Terrorist Behavior and the Probability of Attack
If we were considering insurance and self-protection against, say, natural disasters, we
could take as given the probability of loss as a function of self-protection. The prob-
ability of terrorist attack though is the outcome of interaction between terrorists and
their targets. In this section, we present a simple model of terrorist behavior and use
it to derive some important properties for the probability of terrorist attacks.4 In par-
ticular, if terrorists respond to self-protection by targets, this can create externalities
in protection.5
Consider a “syndicate” of terrorists, criminals, or soldiers with resources R intent
on attacking a set of N targets. From the syndicate’s perspective, the probability of
4An analysis of terrorist behavior is also presented in Major (2002).
5An analysis of criminal deterrence and the associated externalities is oﬀered in Eck (1993).
2succeeding against any given target depends upon what they spend attacking it, and
what the target spends on self-protection.6 The source of the externalities lies in the
responses of terrorists to private self-protection.
When terrorists inﬂict the loss L on target j, they receive the beneﬁt B(L).7 The
probability of inﬂicting this loss is a function ½(sj;rj), where sj is the self-protection
expenditure of target j, and rj is the level of resources spent by terrorists on attacking
target j, so that ½s < 0 and ½r > 0 with the concavity conditions ½ss > 0 and ½rr < 0.
Expenditures on self-protection make terrorist investments less productive, so that
½sr < 0. Terrorists have available resources R, which may be aﬀected by the self-
protection of targets, according to R(s1;:::;sN). For example, by lowering the returns
to terrorist activity, self-protection could discourage its funding.
After the self-protection levels have been set, terrorists allocate their resources











The ﬁrst order conditions of this problem equate the marginal productivity of terrorist
resources across all targets:
½r(si;ri) = ½r(sj;rj) (2.2)

















Increases in self-protection result in a substitution eﬀect and a wealth eﬀect on ter-
rorism. Protection by one target causes terrorists to substitute resources toward
6The self-protection expenditures of other targets has no eﬀect on this probability. We abstract
from technological externalities, such as a surveillance camera that provides protection to a whole
neighborhood.
7We assume here that the value of inﬂicting a loss is independent of the target’s level of self-
protection. This may not always be the case: terrorists may value the destruction of well defended
targets simply as a demonstration of their capabilities. In this case, there could be a “race to the
bottom” in self-protection, where every target would attempt to undercut the others in protective
investments.
3other targets; this substitution eﬀect is embodied by ½rs < 0. In other words, each
target’s probability of attack falls with its own self-protection, but rises with the
self-protection investments of others. On the other hand, wealth eﬀects arise if self-
protection aﬀects terrorist resources.
Absent wealth eﬀects (e.g., if R is ﬁxed), the appendix shows that
@ri
@si < 0 and
@rj
@si > 0: In this case, the substitution eﬀects dominate. Terrorists substitute away
from the fortiﬁed target and toward other targets, yielding negative externalities in
protection.
The case of no wealth eﬀects seems a relevant one for global terrorist groups, for
several reasons. First, there may be no substitute for terrorism, in the sense that
extremist groups without political wings may view it as their only option. If so,
internal funding levels may not respond to self-protection or other changes in the
returns to terrorism. Furthermore, many factors—such as the power of states that
sponsor terrorism, a history of religious or ethnic conﬂict, or the perceived wrongdoing
of the targeted society or group—inﬂuence terrorists’ external funding levels. These
factors are probably of more direct importance to terrorists’ funding levels than self-
protection. In the context of these other factors, the inﬂuence of self-protection may
not be large.
Although we abstract from wealth eﬀects for most of our discussion, one should
bear in mind their possibilities. If protection makes terrorists poorer (Rs < 0), they
will spend less on all targets. This reinforces the substitution eﬀect associated with si
for target i, but could oﬀset the eﬀect for the other targets j 6= i. Terrorists will always
spend less attacking the target that defended itself, but the net change in resources
spent on other targets is ambiguous. On the other hand, protection could make
terrorists richer. For example, if outside sponsors seek to maximize terror, increases
in self-protection after an attack might be interpreted as signs of insecurity and taken
as an indicator of success, leading to more funding. In this case, the wealth eﬀect
would counteract the substitution eﬀect for target i, but reinforce it for the other
targets.
Wealth eﬀects also raise an interesting issue with respect to alternative speciﬁ-
cations of the terrorist problem. We have structured the static problem with self-
protection levels taken as ﬁxed inputs to the terrorist problem, implicitly assuming
that targets commit to self-protection levels in advance of the terrorist attacks. With-
out precommitment, however, terrorists would not take self-protection levels as given.
They would consider the impact of their strategies on self-protection choices and,
hence, their current or future funding. This complication is beyond the scope of this
paper.
An illustration of the potential importance of wealth eﬀects is provided by the
case of unobserved protection. So far, we have assumed that self-protection is observ-
able to terrorists. This seems a reasonable assumption, since terrorists can observe
security guards, surveillance cameras, fences, military installations, the vigilance of
airport or other screeners, or the accessibility of a location. Moreover, terrorists
4have incentives not to attack targets about which they know little. However, in cer-
tain speciﬁc cases of crime or terrorism, protection may be unobserved, and this can
have important consequences. For example, as Ayres and Levitt (1998) have shown,
Lojack—a tracking device on automobiles designed to recover vehicles in the event of
theft—is unobservable. Criminals cannot tell which cars have Lojack installed and
appear to be discouraged from stealing as a result. This is a case where unobservable
protection has positive externalities. Self-protection yields beneﬁts for all, even the
unprotected.
To see this formally, suppose terrorists or criminals know only the mean level of
self-protection, ¯ s, but not the self-protection of a particular target. In this case, the












ri · R(¯ s)
(2.4)
When terrorists cannot distinguish any diﬀerences among targets, optimal behavior
implies an even allocation across targets. In this case, private investments in self-
protection change the mean level of self-protection (and, hence, the overall level of
terrorist resources), but they have no eﬀects on the syndicate’s relative allocation
of resources across targets. The substitution eﬀect present in the case of observed
protection disappears, and only the wealth eﬀect remains. In this case, a free-rider
problem emerges, because no private agent has the incentive to undertake the socially
eﬃcient level of self-protective expenditure. This is a source of positive externalities.
It applies to certain classes of crime, such as auto theft in the presence of Lojack.
3 Private Choices and Public Safety
To understand the impact of negative externalities in self-protection on the behavior
of targets, consider an economy with N agents facing a risk of terrorist attack. The
j-th agent faces risk of experiencing a loss of ﬁxed size L and allocates wealth W
between expenditures on insurance coverage Ij—available at a price ¼j for every
dollar of coverage—and on self-protection sj: Self-protection is purchased at a per
unit price of k; and the individually-chosen levels of self-protection jointly determine
the probabilities of loss faced by each of the agents. Thus, the probability of loss for j
is written as:
pj(s1;:::;sN):
Agent j’s probability of loss is decreasing in her own chosen level of self protec-
tion, but increasing in the levels of self-protection chosen by the other agents. The
5probability of attack satisﬁes:
@pj
@sj











Other agents’ protection investments inﬂuence the probability of attack, because ter-
rorists substitute towards less fortiﬁed targets, or
@rj
@si > 0. The probability of loss
aﬀects the price of insurance, written as:
¼j(s1;:::;sN;®) ´ pj(s1;:::;sN) + ®;
where 0 · ® · 1 reﬂects other inﬂuences on the price of insurance such as administra-
tive expenses, capital costs, and information costs. We will assume that the pricing
reﬂects “real” costs (such as administrative costs or underwriting costs) in the sense
that they cannot be avoided by government intervention.
Finally, we include a public good (or bad) inﬂuenced by self-protection. We write
this as V (s1;:::;sN): The inﬂuence of self-protection could be either positive or neg-
ative, but the key point is that the public good, which is enjoyed by all, is jointly
determined by the individually-chosen levels of self-protection.
3.1 Private Decisions
In this environment, agent j solves:
max
sj;Ij
fpjU0(W ¡ L + (1 ¡ ¼j)Ij ¡ ksj)+
(1 ¡ pj)U1(W ¡ ¼jIj ¡ ksj) + V (s1;:::;sN) g;
(3.2)
where U0 and U1 are increasing functions representing the utility of wealth in the
loss and no-loss states, respectively. If all functions are diﬀerentiable, the individual










When pricing is actuarially fair (¼j = pj), this condition equates marginal utilities
across states. The condition for the choice of self-protection may be written as:
@pj
@sj















6The ﬁrst term is positive and reﬂects self-protection’s mitigating impact on the prob-
ability of loss. The second term reﬂects the net marginal pecuniary cost of self-
protection, including any premium reductions realized. The last term reﬂects the
marginal impact of the individual’s choice on his private valuation of the public good.
To illustrate, when the third term is negative, the agent balances the marginal beneﬁt
associated with loss prevention (the ﬁrst term), with the marginal out-of-pocket cost
(the second term) and the marginal impairment of the public good (the third term).
We now study how individual choices may be socially ineﬃcient. Consider the







[pjU0(W ¡ L + (1 ¡ ¼j)Ij ¡ ksj)+
(1 ¡ pj)U1(W ¡ ¼jIj ¡ ksj) ] + NV (s1;:::;sN) g
(3.5)
This is simply the sum of the utilities of the N agents. The last term is the indi-
vidual valuation of the public good multiplied by the total number of individuals,
representing the total social value of the public good.
The optimality condition for the choice of Ij is identical to Equation 3.3 from the
individual agent’s problem. However, the socially optimal choice for sj is:
@pj
@sj



































where U0i and U1i represent agent i’s utility in the loss and no-loss states, respectively.
The ﬁrst three terms (the top line) are simply the individual eﬀects from Equation 3.4.
The summation term (the bottom line) includes the three marginal “spillover” eﬀects
considered by the social planner but neglected by the individual. This captures the
marginal impact of sj on the probabilities of loss for the other agents, any associated
changes in insurance prices for other agents, and the marginal impact of sj on the
public good values enjoyed by the other agents.
The ﬁrst and second spillovers concern risk and associated costs. In choosing self-
protection, the individual does not consider any eﬀects on the probabilities of loss
faced by other agents and the associated prices of insurance. In the case of terrorism,
the cross-eﬀects could be detrimental, in which case the individual overinvests in self-
protection from a social perspective. In the case of Lojack, they could be beneﬁcial,
in which case the individual underinvests. The total externality is measured by two
components: the direct equilibrium impact of self-protection on the utility of others,
7and the impact on other agents’ insurance premiums. In more general terms, self-
protection by one agent encourages others to undertake remedial expenditures, but
it may also have a direct impact on others’ utility if remedial expenditures are not
complete. For example, if individuals are fully insured, the externality consists solely
of the increase in remedial expenditures on insurance. Conversely, when there is no
terror insurance—and thus no remedial expenditures—the externality consists solely
of the direct eﬀect on utility.8
The last spillover concerns the public good. In choosing self-protection, the in-
dividual does not consider any beneﬁts or costs that accrue to other agents. As an
example, consider cautious behavior by a soldier. It is individually rational for a
soldier to avoid mortality risk at the margin, but such behavior might jeopardize the
nation’s chances of winning a war. To take another salient example, self-protection
against terrorism by a ﬁrm may dictate moving out of downtown areas and avoiding
prominent high-rise buildings. However, there may well be public goods associated
with the presence of prestigious properties in downtown locales.
The source of the ineﬃciency becomes particularly clear if we rewrite this condi-
tion in terms of the primitive probabilities ½. Substituting in the expressions from




























amounts to taking terrorists’ resource allocation decisions as ﬁxed and ignoring the
eﬀect of protection on the decisions of terrorists. Social eﬃciency dictates that agents
treat terrorism just like earthquakes, hurricanes, and other risks of loss where the
probability of loss is independent of self-protection expenditures.
3.2 Government Policy
In this section, we study government policy when it cannot directly control choices,
but must instead rely on policies that inﬂuence market prices. Since the spillovers
are generated by self-protection behavior, that behavior would seem to be the ﬁrst
target for government policy. However, taxes, subsidies, or restrictions aimed at
self-protection may not be cost-eﬀective or even feasible.
For example, consider taxes on bank deposit withdrawals or suspensions of deposit
convertibility. Both of these policies dissuade depositors from running on banks, but
they fail to diﬀerentiate between depositors who “need” the money and those who
8While the change in the insurance premium is, strictly speaking, a pecuniary externality, it
reﬂects an underlying technical (or real) externality, namely the eﬀect of other agents’ self-protection.
The underlying technical externality has a pecuniary impact and a non-pecuniary impact, and thus
its total cost includes both these components.
8do not. Thus, the burden of the policy is highest for the least fortunate, making the
overall social cost of the policy high. Another example is the case of the soldier. It
may be diﬃcult to identify the range of behaviors that qualify as suboptimal self-
protection at the margin. Likewise, self-protection in the case of terrorism entails
a wide range of activities—such as beeﬁng up security, avoiding public places, relo-
cation, and emigration—all of which may be diﬃcult to describe and regulate in a
policy aimed at promoting the national interest. It may be infeasible to isolate and
tax the myriad methods for protecting against terrorism. Even if the government
could identify all such methods, it could not account for investments that are more
than just anti-terrorist in nature. For instance, dogs that sniﬀ bombs and drugs, or
background checks on employees are both ways to protect against terrorism, but they
also have a variety of other functions that the government should not be discouraging.
Instead of directly regulating self-protection, the government can subsidize (or
tax) insurance purchases. Even if the insurance market itself is functioning eﬃciently,
insurance subsidies can be justiﬁed by failures in the market for protection. Another
means of regulating private protection is to provide public protective services, such
as law enforcement in the case of terrorism, or banking regulations in the case of
deposit insurance. If public protection is substitutable with private protection, this
can also limit excessive private protection. Even if it is not, however, the government
may still ﬁnd it optimal to provide public protection when it is uniquely positioned
to limit the probability of loss for its citizens. In this case, public protective policies
would provide an additional impetus for insurance subsidies.
3.2.1 Insurance Subsidies
In cases where it is costly or infeasible to tax self-protection, the indirect approach
of insurance subsidies may yield the desired results. By encouraging or forcing the
purchase of insurance, the government encourages moral hazard and therefore reduces
the negative or positive externalities associated with self-protection.
To see this, consider a government that has access to lump-sum taxation ¿ in order
to subsidize (or tax) insurance prices. The subsidy rate, fj ´ f(Á;¼j); is controlled
by the government through the choice of Á; with
@f
@Á > 0 and 0 ·
@f
@¼j · Á. Agent
j pays the price ¼j ¡ fj. This general speciﬁcation can accommodate a variety of
subsidy schemes. In particular, it allows an “additive” subsidy as in
f(Á;¼j) ´ Á;
where the government oﬀers a ﬁxed contribution per unit of coverage purchased. It
also supports a “multiplicative” subsidy such as
f(Á;¼j) ´ Á¼j;
where the government pays for a ﬁxed fraction of total insurance costs.
Agent j now solves:
9max
sj;Ij
fpjU0((W ¡ ¿j¡L + (1 ¡ ¼j + f(Á;¼j))Ij ¡ ksj) + ::: (3.8)
(1 ¡ pj)U1((W ¡ ¿j¡(¼j ¡ f(Á;¼j))Ij ¡ ksj) + V (s1;:::;sN) g:
The value of the insurance subsidy as a policy tool will depend on whether or
not it discourages self-protection. How will subsidies inﬂuence behavior? The answer
depends on two conditions. First, insurance and self-protection must be substitutes.
In other words, there must be moral hazard: the purchase of more insurance ought to
discourage protective investments. Second, the Nash equilibrium across agents must
be stable in a sense we will outline below. If not, subsidies may not aﬀect coverage
or protection decisions.
Introducing subsidies into Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.4 results in:































A budget-balancing subsidy (i.e., one for which ¿j = f(Á;¼j)Ij) has no impact on
consumption. However, it will lower the price of insurance in Equation 3.9 and thus
raise the net marginal utility of insurance. If f¼ > 0 (e.g., if the subsidy is multiplica-
tive), it also lowers the marginal utility of self-protection. When the government pays
a share of the insurance premium, the agent realizes a smaller share of the premium
reduction associated with investments in self-protection. This weakens incentives for
protection. In the case of an additive subsidy, this eﬀect is not present. In either
case, a subsidy raises the marginal utility of insurance and weakly lowers the marginal
utility of self-protection. These substitution eﬀects will be reinforced if insurance and
self-protection are substitutes–i.e., if there is moral hazard. In the presence of moral
hazard, therefore, subsidies boost insurance and discourage self-protection.
We identify two sets of conditions—outlined more formally in the appendix—that
give rise to moral hazard. In both cases, we employ constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) and pj < 0:5. The ﬁrst set of conditions is actuarially fair insurance pricing
and a multiplicative subsidy, under which f(Á;¼j) = Á¼j. Under actuarially fair




0 + (1 ¡ pj)U0
1). With an additive subsidy, this is equal to
zero,9 but with a multiplicative subsidy, it is negative. For example, suppose the
9Thus, contrary to the ﬁndings of Ehrlich and Becker (1972), we ﬁnd that insurance and self-
protection are independent at the point where pricing is actuarially fair when the relationship be-
tween price and self-protection is maintained. This is because we deﬁne insurance as coverage, while
Ehrlich and Becker deﬁne it as coverage minus premium. Since self-protection always lowers the
insurance premium, their formulation builds in complementarity at the point of actuarial fairness.
10government pays for half the insurance bill. This reduces the agent’s incentives to
lower her premium bill through self-protection.
Without actuarially fair pricing, it is possible to have moral hazard under more
general types of subsidies, including additive subsidies. With unfair pricing, there
exists a partially oﬀsetting income eﬀect. Extra expenditures on insurance still sub-
stitute for self-protection by narrowing the diﬀerence between income in the loss and
no-loss states; this lowers the gains to self-protection. However, extra expenditures
on insurance also lower income and thus may increase risk aversion; this raises the
gain to self-protection. This eﬀect may be particularly signiﬁcant if the premium and
probability of loss are so high that they sum to more than unity. Suﬃcient condi-
tions for this outcome to be averted are CARA utility (which eliminates the eﬀect of
income on risk-aversion) and ¼j ¡ f < 0:5.
When insurance and self-protection are substitutes, subsidies will encourage insur-
ance and discourage self-protection, but only if the equilibrium across agents is stable
in a sense we outline in the appendix. To see why this condition matters, consider
a terrorist group that seeks to hit only one of N identical targets, and to hit only
the least defended target.10 This case has no stable Nash equilibrium with terrorism.
Suppose there is one, so that all targets purchase the same levels of insurance and
self-protection, and all face the probability 1
N of attack. Any one target can lower
her attack probability to zero with just an inﬁnitesimal increase in self-protection.
Therefore, the only stable equilibrium is one in which there is no probability of at-
tack. In this case, government subsidies cannot alter behavior.11 The appendix lists
two conditions suﬃcient to rule this out. Eﬀectively, we require that an individual’s
own self-protection expenditures have a larger impact on her attack probability than
the expenditures of others. Moreover, Proposition 2 in the appendix shows that these
two conditions are met when terrorists solve the problem outlined in Section 2.
As the appendix demonstrates in more detail, subsidies encourage insurance,
@Ij
@Á >
0 and discourage self-protection,
@sj
@Á < 0 under the circumstances outlined above.
The government can then use insurance subsidies as a tool to correct failure in the
market for self-protection. Denote the optimal choices of agent j by I¤
j and s¤
j: The
lump sum taxes are ﬁxed in advance of the agent’s maximization (i.e., the agent takes







N;®;Á) and V ¤
j ´ V (s¤
1;:::;s¤
N):
With equal Pareto weights, the government chooses subsidies to solve:
10This strategy is incompatible with the model of terrorism outlined earlier. It requires the
presence of ﬁxed costs of attack that are high enough to cause terrorists to concentrate all their
resources on a single target.































When the budget remains balanced, subsidies have no direct eﬀects on consumption.
They operate through eﬀects on insurance and self-protection choices. When the indi-
vidual chooses insurance and self-protection optimally (given the taxes and subsidies












































































When subsidies are zero, the top two lines are zero and the third line is positive. As
a result, some subsidization is always optimal. Intuitively, it is costless to distort an
(unsubsidized and) eﬃcient market, so that subsidies are always beneﬁcial initially.
This is true even if prices are actuarially fair.12
The ﬁrst term (top line) reﬂects the marginal cost of distorting the insurance
market. Without subsidies, fj = 0, and this term is zero. As subsidies rise, however, it




In this case, agents are overconsuming insurance relative to its true marginal cost
because they do not consider the eﬀect of their consumption decisions on their tax
bill.
Similarly, the second term (middle line) reﬂects the costs associated with distorting
incentives for individual self-protection. If there are no subsidies, or if the price does
not aﬀect the subsidy level
@fj
@¼j = 0; this term is zero. On the other hand, if there is a
subsidy and the subsidy rises in price (as is the case for a multiplicative subsidy), this
term will be negative because
ds¤
j
dÁ < 0: In other words, subsidies that rise with price
distort the pecuniary incentives for individuals to self-protect, and this term reﬂects
the eﬀect of that distortion.
12One possible caveat applies to a case of adverse selection in the insurance market. If adverse
selection results in a knife-edge separating equilibrium, it is possible that an inﬁnitesimally small
subsidy could break this equilibrium and have adverse consequences for welfare.
12The ﬁnal term (bottom line) reﬂects the beneﬁt of lowering self-protection when it
has external eﬀects. This includes the external eﬀects of others’ self-protection on an





@sm < 0; and
ds¤
m
dÁ < 0: That is, in the case of negative externalities to self-
protection, this term will reﬂect a beneﬁt, because subsidies limit these externalities.
3.2.2 Public Protection
In practice, governments do more to ﬁght terrorism than just intervene in the insur-
ance markets. They develop military and law enforcement strategies to protect their
citizens against terror. The linkages among public protection, self-protection, and in-
surance inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of insurance policy. Even in the presence of public
protection though, the optimal policy is likely to involve some level of subsidies for
terror insurance, because it is costless (on the margin) to distort a perfectly function-
ing insurance market. However, insurance subsidies may be either complementary
or substitutable with public protection, depending on the technological relationship
between public and private protection.
Suppose investments in public protection, ¾, are available at a normalized price
of 1: They lower the probability of loss, but are free from the externalities that
characterize private protection. Finally, the cost of public protection is assumed to
be spread equally over the N agents in the tax bill, so the government’s new budget
constraint is now




Insurance subsidies remain optimal even in the presence of public protection.
The left-hand side of Equation 3.12 gives the marginal utility to the government of
insurance subsidies. As discussed earlier, at a zero subsidy level, the ﬁrst two lines
are zero, because it is costless to distort a perfectly functioning market for insurance.
The third line is always positive, provided that
ds¤
m
dÁ < 0, or that subsidies lower
self-protection. This will be true under the conditions discussed earlier,13 so long as
we have an interior solution in private protection. In other words, if targets protect
themselves at all, the marginal utility of subsidies is always positive in an unsubsidized
equilibrium.
While subsidies are always optimal, it is less clear whether or not they are com-
plementary or substitutable with public protection. To investigate this, we will
ﬁrst examine the relationships among public protection, insurance, and private self-
protection. Under the types of conditions we have been considering, insurance and
public protection are substitutes, because increases in public protection make it
less risky to go uninsured. To see this, denote the marginal utility of wealth as
¸j ´ pjU0
0 + (1 ¡ pj)U0
1 and observe that under a balanced budget constraint,
13These conditions are: ¼ ¡ f < 0:5, unfair pricing, and CARA utility. Alternatively, we can








































We will impose the same three conditions as in the previous section: ¼¡f < 0:5, unfair
pricing, and CARA utility. Under these assumptions, this expression is negative.
Unfair pricing and ¼ ¡ f < 0:5 ensures that the ﬁrst term is negative. The second
term is an income eﬀect that could be positive or negative (or zero), depending on
the productivity of public protection. CARA utility ensures that it is zero.
Public and private protection may be either complements or substitutes. Com-







(U0 ¡ U1) ¡ [pjU
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For simplicity, suppose that f¼¼ = 0, so that the subsidy is at most linear in the
premium. (This accommodates a multiplicative or additive subsidy.) The ﬁrst line
represents the technological relationship between public and private protection—the
direct impact of public protection investment on the productivity of private protec-
tion in reducing the loss probability. The sign of this eﬀect can be positive (if public
protection makes private investments more productive at reducing the loss probabil-
ity) or negative (if the reverse is true). The second line, which is positive, captures an
indirect income eﬀect; by reducing the probability of loss, public protection eﬀectively
makes the agent richer and more willing to spend on private protection. The third
line represents another type of income eﬀect. Spending on private protection aﬀects
the marginal utility of wealth, and this aﬀects the marginal cost of spending resources
on public protection. The sign of this eﬀect depends on two factors: the form of the
utility function, which determines the relationship between self-protection and the
marginal utility of wealth; and whether public protection is costly or beneﬁcial in a
strictly pecuniary sense. Under CARA utility, self protection has no impact on the
marginal utility of wealth and this term is zero.
14If public and private protection are technological complements in reducing the loss
probability, Equation 3.14 is positive under CARA utility; public protection would
then encourage private protection by making it more productive. The technological
eﬀect is positive and reinforced by the indirect income eﬀect (the second line), while
the traditional income eﬀect disappears due to CARA utility. The appendix shows
that, in this case (along with our assumptions of unfair pricing, ¼ < 0:5, and CARA
utility): @s
@¾ > 0; and @I
@¾ < 0.
If, on the other hand, public and private protection are substitutes in reducing the
loss probability, the technological eﬀect will be negative, while the indirect income
eﬀect is positive. The response of the consumer will then depend on which eﬀect
dominates. The appendix proves that, in the case where public and private protection
are perfect substitutes, @s
@¾ < 0; and @I
@¾ = 0
These ﬁndings have important implications for how subsidies should respond
to increases in the eﬃciency of public protection technology. Include the public







N;®;¾). With equal Pareto weights, the































The ﬁrst order condition for insurance subsidies is essentially the same as before.
Assuming that individuals choose insurance and self-protection optimally, the gov-










































































The ﬁrst line represents the social beneﬁt of reducing the probability of loss through
public protection, while the third line represents the pecuniary cost of ﬁnancing pro-
tection. The middle line reﬂects the impact of public protection on private protection
decisions. If public and private protection are complements, this is a cost: public
15protection worsens externalities in private protection. However, if public protection
is suﬃciently productive, the beneﬁts can overcome the costs. In other words, there
can be public protection, even if it worsens these externalities. In this case, increases
in public protection worsen externalities and thus increase the productivity of subsi-
dizing insurance in order to limit them.
On the other hand, when public protection makes private protection less produc-
tive (
@2p
@s@¾ > 0), public protection may discourage private protection ( @s
@¾ < 0): Public
protection then has the added beneﬁt of reducing externalities in private protection.
As a result, additional public protection limits protective externalities and makes
insurance subsidies less productive. In other words, it functions as a substitute for
insurance subsidies. Both are policy techniques that can be used to discourage self-
protection. Insurance premium subsidies accomplish the task indirectly by encourag-
ing higher levels of insurance purchase and thus lowering the gains to self-protection,
while public protection expenditures are direct substitutes for private protection.
Public protection and insurance subsidies may be complementary in other circum-
stances, even in the absence of any strong relationship between public and private
protection. For example, consider the case where the government pays for all insur-
ance premiums to the point of full insurance. In this case, all agents fully insure and
set private protection to zero. In this case, neither insurance nor private protection
respond to changes in public protection, but it may still be optimal for the govern-
ment to provide public protection in order to reduce the tax bill. Mathematically,


























a marginal utility weighted average balancing of the marginal pecuniary cost of public
protection, 1





This example, though extreme, illuminates another sense in which public protec-
tion and insurance subsidies can be complements. Insurance subsidies can mitigate
private incentives for premium reductions while simultaneously increasing the gov-
ernment’s share of insurance premiums. As this share rises, the government is faced
with increased incentives for reducing insurance premiums, and public protection
accomplishes such a reduction.
In general, the government will ﬁnd it optimal to mix subsidies and public pro-
tection according to their cost-eﬃciency in reducing private protection and according
to their level of complementarity. Changes in the eﬃciency of public protection can
be expected to aﬀect the optimal mix according to the relationship between public
protection and private protection. When public protection and private protection are
substitutes, changes in the eﬃciency of public protection—manifested by an increase
in
@p
@¾—would cause an increase in public protection, but a decrease in subsidies. On
the other hand, if public and private protection are complements, the same increase
16in eﬃciency might result in more subsidies, not less. In the latter case, subsidies are
used in part to counteract the ill eﬀects of public protection on the market for private
protection.
4 Conclusion
Insurance and protection against terrorism—like insurance against crime or war—is
distinguished by its inﬂuence on the behavior of terrorists and thus on the probability
of loss. This creates externalities in the market for protection. A terrorist group can
create negative externalities in protection that call for government insurance subsidies,
just by pursuing its own objectives rationally. These subsidies are still optimal even
in the presence of public law enforcement strategies.
This paper argues that, if the U.S. federal government does decide to subsidize
terrorism insurance, the primary motivation will likely have been these externali-
ties. Indeed, the capital market frictions emphasized in this and other catastrophe
markets (see, e.g., Froot, 1997) may be the catalyst for government action, but the
distinguishing feature of the terrorism insurance market—and the feature that may
ultimately trigger the enactment of subsidies—is the external eﬀects associated with
self protection. A construction project foundering in Manhattan due to lack of af-
fordable terrorism insurance coverage may be seen as a national public policy issue,
while similar foundering associated with windstorm or earthquake insurance coverage
is not. The framework of this paper can be used to interpret terrorism insurance sub-
sidies as a strategy of inﬂuencing behavior in the context of a war eﬀort. In this light,
government-sponsored terrorism insurance appears to have more in common with war-
risk life insurance (government insurance provided to soldiers) or propaganda (which
discourages behavior likely to generate negative externalities, and vice-versa) than
with programs aimed at remedying the problems in catastrophe insurance markets
(such as the National Flood Insurance Program).
Although the main focus of this paper was the terrorism insurance market, the
paper’s ideas need not be so limited in their application. To illustrate the exten-
sion of the ideas, we have highlighted deposit insurance and banking regulation as
an example of insurance subsidies and public protection working in tandem, with
the former a policy speciﬁcally aimed at discouraging self-protective behavior. Going
further, it seems likely that the government’s policy of subsidization in other insur-
ance markets—such as health insurance—may also have behavioral goals that have
remained largely unexplored by economists. This seems a fruitful area for future
research.
17Mathematical Appendix
The individual chooses insurance and self-protection to maximize the objective func-
tion discussed in the text:
Q ´ pjU0(W ¡ L ¡ ¿j + (1 + f(Á;¼j) ¡ ¼j)Ij ¡ ksj)+
(1 ¡ pj)U1(W ¡ ¿j + (f(Á;¼j) ¡ ¼j)Ij ¡ ksj) + Vj
(A.1)
This is subject to the budget-balancing constraint:
¿j = f(Á;¼j)Ij (A.2)




[U0 ¡ U1] ¡ [pjU
0








)) + Vsj = 0 (A.3)
QIj = pjU
0
0(1 + f(Á;¼j) ¡ ¼j) ¡ (1 ¡ pj)U
0
1(¼ ¡ f(Á;¼j)) = 0 (A.4)
The second derivatives are given by:
QIjIj = pU
00
0(1 + f ¡ ¼)






































































The term ¸j ´ pjU0
0 + (1 ¡ pj)U0
1 represents the marginal utility of wealth.
Before proceeding with comparative statics, we must verify that the second order
conditions hold. The fulﬁllment of the second order conditions turns out to depend
on the “curvature” of the loss probability function relative to the curvature of the
utility function. The following proposition identiﬁes some conditions suﬃcient for the
ﬁrst order conditions to represent a maximum.
18Proposition 1 Let p be decreasing and convex and U be a CARA utility function with
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion given by ¹. Let Z =
p00
p0 and Y =
p0
p ; with ¹ =
jY j · jZj: If, in addition, subsidized prices are weakly unfair, f¼¼ = 0; V = 0; k = 1;
and ¼ < 0:5; the second order conditions are satisﬁed.
Proof: The SOC are satisﬁed if (a) QIjIj < 0; (b) Qsjsj < 0; and (c) QIjIjQsjsj ¡
¡
QsjIj
¢2 > 0: Inspection of Equation A.5 reveals that (a) is satisﬁed. To see that (b)























Since 0 < (k + Ijp0(1 ¡ f¼)) < k = 1 and ¡Z ¸ ¹; Qsjsj < 0:
To see that (c) is satisﬁed, use CARA utility and Equation A.4) to write Equa-
tion A.5 as
QIjIj = ¡¹¸j(1 + f ¡ ¼j)(¼j ¡ f):
Similarly, use Equation A.4 to write Equation A.7 as
QsjIj = Y ¸j
·
(1 + f ¡ ¼j)(¼j ¡ f)
(1 ¡ pj)
¡ pj(1 ¡ f¼)
¸
:
Next, solve for "j = Ijp0
j(1 ¡ f¼): From Equation A.3,
p0[U0 ¡ U1]
¸j






























(1 + f ¡ ¼j)(¼j ¡ f)
(1 ¡ pj)
¸2




¢2 > 0 () p < 0:5: QED:
19Even if the second order conditions hold, comparative statics are complicated by
the interactions among the agents. We must consider these interactions when deter-
mining how a change in an underlying parameter—such as the level of the subsidy—
will aﬀect individual behavior. To do this, we study a symmetric equilibrium where all
agents have the same preferences, make identical choices, and face the same prices, loss
probabilities, subsidies, and taxes. Furthermore, we impose additional restrictions on
the relationship between the probability of loss and agent actions. Speciﬁcally, as de-





























Are these restrictions reasonable? To shed more light on what they mean, consider
the terrorist problem outlined in Equation 2.1. In the following proposition, we show
that both restrictions are plausible. The ﬁrst restriction is a direct implication of
terrorist maximization in a symmetric setting under standard regularity conditions.
The second restriction depends, in part, on third derivatives of the loss probability
function; if these terms are suﬃciently small relative to the second and ﬁrst order
eﬀects, the second restriction will hold. To illustrate this, we assume that the third
derivatives are zero in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose terrorists solve Equation 2.1, with ﬁxed R, ½s < 0; ½r > 0;

















¯: Suppose, in addition, that ½s and psr are bounded from below, ½r
and ½ss are bounded away from zero, and all third partials of ½ are zero. Then, for






























r = 0 i = 1;:::;N ¡ 1:





































20where the superscripts indicate the subscript of the ﬁrst argument in the probability
function (i.e., ½1
rr = ½rr(s1;r1)). Evidently, for all i and j; ½i
rr = ½j
rr = ½rr < 0: It is
then easy to verify that the second order conditions for a maximum hold.
The determinant of H can be calculated as N(½rr)N¡1: A simple exercise in com-


















¡½sr ½rr : : : ½rr
0 2½rr ½rr : : ½rr
: ½rr 2½rr :
: : : :
: : : :



























;8 i;j 6= i: (A.9)




















































































To determine the value of this expression, we calculate
@2pj
@sj@sj

































21The proposition is proven if the numerator of Equation A.12 is positive. Using Equa-



































where we have noted that the last terms in both Equations A.13 and A.14 are zero, as






















¯ is bounded and ½ss is positive and bounded away from zero, the








































> 0, CARA utility, and V = 0,
then sign(
dsj
dÁ ) = sign(
dsj
dÁ jsk), and sign(
dIj
dÁ ) = ¡sign(
dsj
dÁ ).
Proof: We can decompose the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of subsidies as follows:




























D is the determinant of the Hessian matrix. To prove sign(
dsj
dÁ ) = sign(
dsj
dÁ jsk),













+ Vsj ¡ ¸jk; (A.18)
where ¸j is the marginal utility of wealth. Diﬀerentiating this equivalence, and ob-
































Using the above two expressions, we can derive:
QIjIj
P




























































> 0, it is straightfor-
ward to show that this expression exceeds ¡1. This proves sign(
dsj
dÁ ) = sign(
dsj
dÁ jsk).
To prove that sign(
dIj
dÁ ) = ¡sign(
dsj
























@sj@sk < 0. Therefore, ds
dÁ
PN
k=1 Qsjsk < 0.
As a result, if ds
dÁ > 0, the change in self-protection levels will lower Qsj. Since a
budget-balancing subsidy has the direct eﬀect of weakly lowering Qsj, the only way
for the individual to remain at her optimal level of self-protection is for her to lower
insurance and thus boost Qsj in response. Similarly, if ds
dÁ < 0, the resulting change in
self-protection levels will raise Qsj and necessitate an oﬀsetting increase in Ij. QED
Corollary 3.1 Under the conditions of Proposition 3, sign(
dsj





d¾ ) = ¡sign(
dsj
d¾ ).
23Proof. The proof of sign(
dsj
d¾ ) = sign(
dsj
d¾ jsk) is identical to the one in the proposition,




















k=1 QIjsk < 0. As a result, if ds
d¾ > 0, the
change in self-protection levels will lower QIj. Recall from the text that QIj¾ < 0.
Therefore, the change in ¾ will also lower QIj. The only way for the individual to
remain at an optimal level of insurance is to lower Ij in response. Similarly, if ds
d¾ < 0,
equilibrium requires that Ij rises. QED
Proposition 4 Assume 0:5 > ¼ ¡f > p, fÁ¼ ¸ 0; CARA utility, and the conditions
of Proposition 1 hold. Then
dsj
dÁ jsk < 0 and
dIj
dÁ jsk > 0.
Proof. With 0:5 > ¼ > p, @¼
@s =
@pj













@s , and ¼ + p < 1. In the last term, (k + @¼
@sj(1 ¡ f¼)Ij) > 0, because
U0 < U1. CARA utility guarantees that the ﬁnal term in parentheses (which equals
d¸j
dIj ) is zero.
Under a balanced budget constraint, we have the relationships QIjÁjsk = fÁ¸j > 0,
and QsjÁjsk = fÁ¼
@¼j














where D is the (positive, by virtue of Proposition 1) determinant of the Hessian
matrix. Evidently,
dsj
dÁ jsk is strictly negative, and
dIj
dÁ jsk is strictly positive. QED
Corollary 4.1 Under the conditions of Propositions 1, 2, and 4,
dsj




Proof. Under the conditions of CARA utility, ¼ > p, and ¼ + p < 1, Proposition
4 implies that
dsj
dÁ jsk < 0, and
dIj
dÁ jsk > 0. The strategic equilibrium conditions and
Proposition 3 then imply that
dsj
dÁ < 0 and
dIj
dÁ > 0. QED
Proposition 5 If ¼ ¡f = p, ¼ < 0:5; CARA utility, the conditions of Proposition 1
hold, and f(Á;¼j) = Á¼j, then
dsj
dÁ jsk < 0 and
dIj
dÁ jsk > 0.
Proof. With fair pricing, QsjIj = ¸f¼
@pj
@sj. With a multiplicative subsidy, this expres-
sion is strictly negative. Equations A.22 and A.23 then imply the results. QED
24Corollary 5.1 Under the conditions of Proposition 1, 2, and 5,
dsj
dÁ < 0, and
dIj
dÁ > 0.
Proof. The conditions of Proposition 5 imply that
dsj
dÁ jsk < 0. Propositions 2 and 3
then imply that
dsj
dÁ < 0 and
dIj
dÁ > 0. QED
Proposition 6 If 0:5 > ¼ ¡ f > p,
@2p
@s@¾ < 0; utility is CARA, and the conditions of
Proposition 1 hold, then
dsj
d¾ jsk > 0 and
dIj
d¾ jsk < 0.
Proof. In the text, it was shown that these conditions imply QIj¾ < 0 and Qsj¾ > 0.
The proof of Proposition 4 showed that they implied QIjsj < 0. Standard comparative













The results then follow from these expressions. QED
Corollary 6.1 Under the conditions of Propositions 1, 2, and 6,
dsj




Proof. Proposition 6 implies that
dsj





d¾ < 0. QED.









@sj@¾ > 0); the conditions of Proposition 1 hold, and CARA utility, then
dsj
d¾ jsk < 0 and
dIj
d¾ jsk = 0.
Proof. These conditions imply that QIj¾ = QIjsj and Qsj¾ = Qsjsj: Comparative

















Corollary 7.1 Under the conditions of Propositions 1, 2, and 7,
dsj




Proof. Proposition 7 implies that
dsj
d¾ jsk < 0 and
dIj
d¾ jsk = 0: Corollary 3.1 then
implies that
dsj
d¾ > 0, and
dIj
d¾ < 0. QED.
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